Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1975

Utah v. Kendrick : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Vernon B. Romney; Attorney General; Attorney for Respondent.
James F. Housley; Housley and Black; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. William Harold Kendrick, No. 13888.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1975).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/122

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

RECEIVED
LAW LIBRARY

IN THE SUPREME COURT197**
OF THE STATE OFwUTAM miasm.
i. Reoben Clark Law School
W I L L I A M HAROLD KENDRICK,
Defendant-Appellant,
Case No.
[ 13888
T H E STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent.

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah
Jay E. Banks, District Judge

JAMES F. HOUSLEY
HOUSLEY & BLACK
316 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendant
Appellant
r
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
for the State of Utah

Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent

If" S L £ i
Cfert sT

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
NATURE OF T H E CASE
1
DISPOSITION IN T H E LOWER COURT .... 1
R E L I E F SOUGHT ON A P P E A L
2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
3
ARGUMENT
7
T H E TRIAL COURT E R R E D IN PERMITTING T H E PROSECUTOR TO ASK
LEADING AND SUGGESTIVE QUESTIONS OF A PROSECUTION WITNESS,
APPELLANT'S CO-DEFENDANT,
JAMES E. TRAVIS, AND IN PERMITTING T H E COURT REPORTER W H O
REPORTED TRAVIS' TRIAL TO TESTI F Y AS TO TRAVIS' TESTIMONY AT
H I S OWN TRIAL CONCERNING APPELLANT'S PARTICIPATION IN T H E
A L L E G E D ROBBERY W H E R E TRAVIS'
TRIAL HAD BEEN SEVERED FROM
THAT OF A P P E L L A N T AND W H E R E
T H E PROSECUTION H A D KNOWLEDGE T H A T TRAVIS WOULD R E F U S E
TO ANSWER QUESTIONS PROPOUNDED BY T H E PROSECUTION
ON T H E GROUND T H A T H I S
ANSWERS WOULD TEND TO INCRIMINATE HIM.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

19

i

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
I N D E X OF A U T H O R I T I E S
Barber vs. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318,
20 L.Ed. 2d 255

11, 12

Bruton vs. U.S., 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620,
20 L.Ed. 2d 476
11, 12, 17
Constitution of the United States:
Article 6, Clause 2

12

Amendments to the Constitution V
Amendments to the
Constitution V I

7, 12, 13, 15
8, 11, 12, 16, 17

Amendments to the Constitution X I V

12, 16, 17

Constitution of Utah:
Article I, Section 12
8, 9, 11, 12
Douglas vs. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct.
1074, 13 L.Ed. 2d 934
11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17
Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct.
792, 9 L.Ed. 2d 799, 93 A.L.R. 2d 733
12, 17
Kirby vs. U.S., 174 U.S. 47,
19 S.Ct. 574, 43 L.Ed. 890
16
Malloy vs. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,
84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed. 2d 653
12
Motes vs. U.S., 178 U.S. 458, 20 S.Ct. 993,
44 L.Ed. 1150
,

16, 17

Palko vs. Connecticutt, 302 U.S. 319,
58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288

12

Pointer vs. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065,
13 L.Ed. 2d 923
11, 12, 17
it

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended:
76-3-404

4

76-6-301

1, 2

76-6-301 (1)

2

76-6-301(1) (a)

.............

2

77-1-8(1)

9, 10, 11

77-1-8(4)

9, 10, 11

77-44-3

...9, 10, 11

Hi
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM HAROLD KENDRICK, \
Defendant-Appellant,

i

xro

>

Case No.
T H E STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent.

[
\
J

13888

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S BRIEF
N A T U R E OF T H E CASE
This is a prosecution for robbery, a felony of the
second degree, under the provisions of Section 76-6-301,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
DISPOSITION IN T H E L O W E R COURT
After a trial before a jury which returned a verdict of "quilty of robbery as charged in the information", the trial court entered a judgment and commitment sentencing defendant-appellant to the Utah State
Prison for the indeterminate term (1-15 years) as provided by law for the crime of robbery.
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R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
Defendant-appellant seeks reversal of the judgment and commitment based on said verdict and the
discharge of said defendant-appellant or, that failing,
reversal of said judgment and commitment and remand
of the case back to the trial court for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 27, 1974, defendant-appellant and James
E . Travis were charged by a Complaint filed in the
City Court of Salt Lake City with aggravated robbery
in violation of Sections 76-6-301(1) and 76-6-301(1)
(a) a first degree felony ". . . as follows, to-wit: that
said James E . Travis and William Harold Kendrick,
. . . [on or about the 26th day of June, 1974 at the
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah] . . . , robbed Blair
C. Roberts and Robert C. Zancanella, and in so doing
used a deadly weapon, to wit: a wooden club; . . . " (R.
10). On July 18, 1974, a preliminary hearing was held,
after which the court dismissed the charge of aggravated robbery, ordered that the Complaint be amended
to charge non-aggravated robbery and bound both defendants over to stand traial in the District Court on
the Amended Complaint (R. 2).
On July 25, 1974, an Information was filed by
the Salt Lake County Attorney charging James E .
Travis and William Harold Kendrick with "robbery,
a felony of the second degree, in violation of Section
76-6-301, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, as
follows, to-wit: that on or about the 26th day of June,

2
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1974, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the said
James E . Travis and William Harold Kendrick robbed Blair C. Roberts and Robert C. Zancanella; . .•-•"••
(R.ll).
On July 26, 1974, both defendants entered pleas
of "not guilty" to the crime of robbery as charged in
the information (See Minute Entry, R. 13). Motions
to Sever were filed in behalf of defendant Travis on
July 29, 1974 (R. 16) and by defendant Kendrick on
August 26,1974 (R. 19).
On August 9, 1974, the undersigned was appointed
as counsel for the defendant-appellant (Minute Entry
of August 9,1974, R. 17 and Order of August 16,1974,
R. 18).
On August 26, 1974, the date set for joint trial
of defendant-appellant and his co-defendant, James E .
Travis, the court heard argument and took testimony
on the Motions to Sever of each of said defendants and
thereafter granted the Motion to Sever and ordered
that defendant-appellant's co-defendant, James E .
Travis, be tried first, beginning on that date. (See
Minute Entry of August 26, 1974, R. 23-24; Transcript of Proceedings of Monday, August 26, 1974, pps.
1-21).
The trial of defendant-appellant's co-defendant,
James E . Travis commenced thereafter. In addition to
the evidence presented by the state therein, James E .
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Travis took the stand and testified in his own defense.
During his testimony he testified, in substance and
effect, that the robbery was committed by defendantappellant (See Minutes of August 27, 1974 and August
28, 1974, R. 25 and R. 26; See also Transcript pps.
195-252).
Following introduction of further evidence, instructions by the court and argument by counsel, the
jury returned the verdict finding James E . Travis
guilty of robbery as charged in the information (See
Minutes of August 28, 1974; R. 27 and Verdict, R. 49).
On September 20, 1974, defendant-appellant's codefendant, James E . Travis, was committed to the custody of Division of Corrections under Utah Code 76-3404 for ninety-days evaluation period and ordered to
be returned to court on December 27, 1974 for sentencing (See Minutes of September 20, 1974, R. 90 and
Order, R. 96).
From that Order James E . Travis appealed to
this court in a separate appeal No. 13834 entitled,
"State of Utah, Plaintiff-respondent vs. James E .
Travis, Defendant-appellant." As of the date of this
Brief, said appeal is still pending.
On September 11, 1974, defendant-appellant's
severed jury trial commenced before the Honorable
J a y E . Banks, District Judge, sitting with a jury and
continued to September 12. At the conclusion of the
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trial, the jury returned a verdict finding the defendantappellant guilty of robbery as charged in the information (See Minute Entries of September 11, 1974, R.
58-59 and September 12, 1974, R. 54-57 and Verdirt,
R.86-2ndpage).
During his case in chief, the prosecutor repeatedly
referred to, and questioned witnesses concerning, Exhibit 7, a steel pinch bar with an electrical cord wrapped
around it to form a handle. A t the conclusion of the
prosecution's case in chief, Exhibit 7 was received into
evidence over defendant-appellant's objections (TR.
137, R. 60).
After the prosecution rested its case in chief, defendant-appellant, in his own defense, took the stand
and testified, in substance and effect, that he and his
co-defendant had been subjected to homosexual assault
by Robert C. Zancanella while patronizing the Radio
City Lounge; that after the lounge had closed, they,
together with Lynn Ruwe, went to a party at the
home of Duane Daniel, the day bartender at the Radio
City Lounge; that while at the party, he was subjected
to an homosexual assault by Duane Daniel whereupon
defendant-appellant, his fiancee and his co-defendant
left the party and returned to the Radio City Lounge
to buy beer; that he entered the Radio City Lounge
and was subjected to another homosexual assault by
Robert C. Zancanella whereupon he hit Zancanella;
that Blair Roberts then entered into the fight and defendant hit Blair Roberts (TR. 152-156). Defendant5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

appellant further testified that he then left the bar and
that no robbery occurred. Defendant-appellant explained the presence of money and other property allegedly taken in the robbery in the car of Miss Ruwe
at the time of their arrest by theorizing either that
Duane Daniel left those objects in the car during the
ride from the Radio City Lounge to Daniel's home or
that Travis or Lynn Ruwe took the property from the
home of Duane Daniel and left it in the car (TR. 160163).
In its rebuttal, the prosecution called defendantappellant's co-defendant, James E. Travis. When
Travis refused to testify, the prosecution was permitted, over defense objections, to ask Travis leading questions which incorporated the testimony given in his own
earlier severed trial. Travis declined to answer said
questions on the ground that it might tend to incriminate him (TR. 185-187). In addition, the prosecution
was permitted to introduce testimony of the court reporter who reported the proceedings at Travis' trial
and who read, verbatim from her notes, the testimony
of Travis given in his own defense at his trial (TR.
187-196).
The substance and effect of Travis' testimony was
that defendant-appellant was the one who robbed Roberts and Zancanella at the Radio City Loung (TR.
196-252). Defendant-appellant made timely and continuous objections to the foregoing (TR. 188, 193, 195196, 253-254, 260-261) and made timely Motion for
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Mistrial (TR. 253, 260-261) and Motion to Strike
(TR. 254, 261). Counsel for defendant-appellant attempted to cross-examination Travis but Travis invoked his 5th Amendment privilege and refused to
testify (TR. 256-260).
Following instructions by the court, the prosecutor
argued, in his summation, over the objections of the defense, that because defendant refused to tell the police
officers, during their interrogation of him on the morning of the alleged robbery, what happened at Daniel's
party and at the Radio City Lounge, that defendantappellant's testimony was unworthy of belief (TR. 262264).
Upon the verdict finding defendant-appellam
guilty of robbery as charged in the information, the
court entered a judgment and commitment directing
the defendant-appellant be confined and imprisoned in
the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term (1
to 15 years) provided by law for the crime of robbery
(R. 98-99) (TR. 272).
From that judgment and commitment, defendantappellant brings this appeal.
Additional facts will be discussed and developed
within the body of the Argument.
ARGUMENT
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D IN
M I T T I N G T H E P R O S E C U T O R TO

PERASK
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LEADING AND SUGGESTIVE QUESTIONS
OF A PROSECUTION WITTNESS, APPELLANT'S C O - D E F E N D A N T , J A M E S E. TRAVIS, A N D I N P E R M I T T I N G T H E COURT REPORTER W H O REPORTED TRAVIS' TRIAL
TO T E S T I F Y A S TO T R A V I S ' T E S T I M O N Y
AT H I S OWN TRIAL CONCERNING APPELLANT'S PARTICIPATION IN T H E ALL E G E D ROBBERY W H E R E TRAVIS' TRIAL
H A D B E E N SEVERED FROM T H A T OF APP E L L A N T AND W H E R E T H E PROSECUTION H A D KNOWLEDGE T H A T TRAVIS
W O U L D R E F U S E TO A N S W E R Q U E S T I O N S
P R O P O U N D E D B Y T H E P R O S E C U T I O N ON
THE
GROUND
THAT
HIS
ANSWERS
W O U L D T E N D TO I N C R I M I N A T E H I M .
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah
provides in part, "In criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right . . . to be confronted by the witnesses against him . . . " and the 6th Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States provides in part,
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the r i g h t . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him..."
The undersigned has been unable to find any Utah
cases which specifically holds whether the right of confrontation guaranteed by Article I, Section 12, of the
Constitution of Utah does or does not include or imply
8
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the right of cross-examination, effective cross-examination or cross-examination by counsel.
The Utah State Legislature has enacted, in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, two statutes which, though inapplicable to this
case, seem to implement Article I, Section 12 of the
Constitution of Utah or apparently purport to be controlled thereby:
"77-1-8. The Rights of Defendant.—In criminal prosecutions, the defendant is entitled:
(1) To appear and defend in person by counsel.
(4) To be confronted by the witnesses against
him, except that, where the charge has been preliminary examined before a commiting magistrate and the testimony taken down by question
or answer in the presence of the defendant, who
has, either in person or by counsel, cross-examined or had an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness, or where the testimony of a witness on
the part of the state, who is unable to give security for his appearance, has been conditionally
in like manner in the presence of the defendant,
who has, either in person or by counsel, crossexamined or has had an opportunity to crossexamine the witness, the deposition of such witness may be read, upon its being satisfactorily
shown to the court that he is dead or insane or
cannot with due deligence be found within the
state . . . " [Emphasis Added]
"77-44-3. Reported testimony used at subse-

9
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quent trial, when.—Whenever in any court of
record the testimony of any witness in any criminal case shall be stenographically reported by
an official court reporter, and thereafter such
witness shall die or be beyond the jurisdiction of
the court in which the case is pending, either
party to the action may read in evidence the
testimony of such witness, when duly certified
by the reporter to be correct, in any subsequent
trial law, or proceeding had in, the same cause,
subject only to the same objections that might be
made, if such witness were upon the stand and
testifying in open court." [Emphasis Added]
Clearly, Sections 77-1-8 and 77-44-3 cannot be invoked to justify the receipt into evidence of the court
reporter's testimony in this case simply because neither
of those provisions was invoked nor could they have
application, by their own terms. 77-1-8 (4) requires that
the testimony at preliminary hearing be "in the presence of the defendant, who has, either in person or by
counsel, cross-examined or had an opportunity to crossexamine the witness" and the state made no showing,
indeed could not show, "that the witness is dead or insane or cannot with due diligence be found within the
state." 77-44-3 impliedly requires that the earlier trial
be the trial of the defendant against whom the testimony is offered and the state did not show and could
no show that the witness was dead or beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
The undersigned has been unable to find any Utah
cases which hold whether the right of confrontation

10
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guaranteed by Article I, Section 12, of the Constitution
of Utah does or does not include or imply the right to
cross-examination, the right of effective cross-examination or the right to cross examination by counsel. Sections 77-1-8(1) and (4), though not apropos to this
case, appear to guarantee by statute the right to crossexamination and cross-examination by counsel where
the accused has counsel. The trial court did not indicate whether it was applying Section 77-44-3 in admitting the reporter's testimony of Travis' statement
in his own defense at his own trial. I t does not appear
from reading the transcript that Section 77-44-3 was
the basis for its admission.
The undersigned has been unable to find any Utah
cases which test the constitutionality of Section 77-44-3
in light of the guarantees contained in Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah and in the 6th
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
Section 77-44-3 is, however, patently unconstitutional
unless there is implied therein the requirement that the
accused be accorded the right to confront the witness
and to cross-examine said witness. Bruton vs. U.S.,
391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed. 2d 476; Pointer
vs. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065,13 L.Ed.2d 923;
Douglas vs. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct. 1074,
13 L.Ed.2d 934; Barber vs. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88
S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed. 2d 255.
The foregoing not withstanding, however, the
right of an accused to confront the witnesses against

11
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him guaranteed by the 6th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States (and presumably Article
I, Section 12 of the Constituion of Uah by virtue of
the supremacy clause, Article 6, Clause 2, Constitution
of the United States) implies the right to effective
cross-examination of those witnesses (See Douglas vs.
Alabama, supra; Pointer vs. Texas, supra; Bruton vs.
U.S., supra; Barber vs. Page, supra) by counsel (See
Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9
L.Ed. 2d 799, 93 A.L.R. 2d 733; Pointer vs. Texas,
supra;) and that right is not satisfied by the mere fact
that the witnesses are present in court (See Bruton vs.
U.S., supra; Douglas vs. Alabama, supra;) or take
the stand to deny that they made the statements (See
Douglas vs. Alabama, supra) or exercise their 5th
Amendment privilege against self incrimination (See
Douglas vs. Alabama, supra).
The aforesaid right of cross examination is deemed
a right "fundamental and essential to a fair trial" and
is made obligatory upon the states by the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Pointer
vs. Texas, supra; Douglas vs. Alabama, supra; Malloy
vs. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed. 2d
653. Mr. Justice Harlan, in his opinions concurring in
the results in Pointer and Gideon stated that the right
is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and thus
secured to defendants in state prosecutions by the 14th
Amendment under the rationale of Palko vs. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288 (13 L.
Ed. 2d at page 929; 9 L.Ed. 2d at page 810).

12
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The case at bar and the procedure employed by
the trial court and by the prosecution herein is unique.
I t would be unusual indeed to find a case precisely
identical to the instant case where the following features were present:
1. Where the accused and his co-defendant were
represented by separate and unassociated counsel;
2. Where there was a severance of the trials of
joint defendants prior to trial, and where the co-defendant was convicted in his severed case tried first;
3. Where the co-defendant took the stand and
testified in his own defense, which testimony inculpated
the accused;
4. Where the co-defendant had not been sentenced
at the time of trial of the accused and where the codefendant genuinely contemplated appeal of his conviction;
5. Where the co-defendant was called by the
prosecution as a witness against the accused and where
the co-defendant refused to testify and based his refusal upon the co-defendant's 5th Amendment right
against self-incrimination;
6. Where the prosecutor knew that the co-defendant would not testify;
7. Where the court permitted the prosecutor to
ask leading questions of the co-defendant whereby the

13
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prosecutor read into the record the testimony which
inculpated the accused;
8. Where the court admitted
court reporter who reported the
and permitted the court reporter
jury, verbatim, the co-defendant's
ing the accused;

the testimony of the
co-defendant's trial
to read, before the
statements inculpat-

9. Where the co-defendant refused to answer the
questions by counsel for the accused on cross-examination on the ground that the co-defendant's answers
might tend to incriminate him; and
10. Where the refusal by the co-defendant to testify against the accused was not procured by the accused.
The writer of this brief has been unable, after extensive research, to find a case incorporating all of the
foregoing features. The case of Douglas vs. Alabama,
supra, decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States in 1965, however, is almost identical and incorporates almost all of the salient features of this case.
In Douglas, there were the following identical or parallel features:
1. Douglas and his co-defendant, Loyd, were represented by the same attorney.
2. There was a severance of the trials of Douglas and Loyd prior to trial and Loyd was convicted in
his severed case tried first.
14
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3. Loyd did not take the stand in his own trial
but apparently had previously given an out of court
statement to the police, which out of court statement inculpated Douglas.
4. Loyd had not been sentenced at the time of the
trial of Douglas and Loyd genuinely contemplated
appeal of his conviction.
5. Loyd was called by the prosecution as a witness
against Douglas and Loyd refused to testify and based
his refusal upon Loyd's 5th Amendment right against
self-incrimination.
6. The prosecutor knew Loyd would not testify.
7. The court permitted the prosecutor to ask leadin gquestions of Loyd whereby the prosecutor read
into the record the out of court statement of Loyd
which inculpated Douglas.
8. Loyd's alleged out of court statement was
marked as an Exhibit but was not offered or received
into evidence.
9. The decision in Douglas, does not show whether
or not there was any attempt to cross examine Loyd
by counsel for Douglas.
10. There was no suggestion that Loyd's refusal to
testify against Douglas was procured by Douglas.
The variations between the salient features in
15
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Douglas and those in the case at bar are minor and of
little or no legal significance. If anything, the procedures employed by the prosecution and the trial court
in the case at bar are more flagrant and prejudicial
than in Douglas. The Supreme Court of the United
States reversed Douglas' conviction on the ground that
Douglas' inability to cross examine his co-defendant as
to the alleged confession plainly denied him the right
of cross examination secured by the confrontation clause
of the 6th Amendment and made obligatory on the
States by the Due Process provisions of the 14th
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
In Douglas, the court stated:
"Since the solicitor [prosecutor] was not a
witness, the inference from his reading that Loyd
made the statement could not be tested by crossexaminaion. Similarly, Loyd could not be crossexamined on a statement imputed to but not
admitted by him. Nor was the opportunity to
cross-examine the law enforcement officers adequate to redress this denial of the essential right
secured by the Confrontation Clause. Indeed,
their testimony enhanced the danger that the
jury would treat the Solicitor's questioning of
Loyd and Loyd's refusal to answer as providing
the truth of Loyd's alleged confession. But since
their evidence tended to show only that Loyd
mad the confession, cross examination of them
as to its genuineness could not substitute for
cros-examination of Loyd to test the truth of the
statement itself. Motes vs. United States, 178
U.S. 458, 44 L.Ed. 1150, 20 S.Ct. 993; cf. Kirbv
v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 43 L.Ed. 890, 19
S.Ct. 574.
16
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"Hence, effective confrontation of L o y d was
possible only if Loyd affirmed the statement as
his. However, L o y d did not do so, but relied on
his privilege to refuse to answer. W e need not
decide whether Loyd properly invoked the privilege in light of his conviction. I t is sufficient for
the purposes of deciding petitioner's claim undes
the Confrontation Clause that no suggestion is
made that Loyd's refusal to answer was procured
by the petitioner, see Motes v. United States,
supra, 178 U . S . at 471, 44 L . E d , at 1154; on
this record it appears that Loyd was acting entirely in his own interests in doing so . . ." 13 L .
E d . 2d at p. 938.
T h a t the court permitted the prosecutor to read
into the record Travis' testimony at his own trial and
that the court admitted the verbatim record of that
testimony is prejudicial to the rights of the defendant
guaranteed by the 6th and 14th Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States cannot be denied.
Bruton vs. U . S . , supra; Pointer vs. Texas, supra;
Gideon vs. Wainwright, supra.
The extreme prejudice to appellant generated by
the introduction by the prosecution and receipt by
the court of Travis' testimony in his own severed trial
without according appellant an opportunity to crossexamine Travis is made even more apparent when, after
reading the entire record in this case, it is observed
that there was no hint or suggestion to the j u r y t h a t
a weapon, more particularly the pinch bar received in
evidence as Exhibit 7, had been used in the alleged
17
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robbery, apart from the very presence, and brandishment by the prosecution, of Exhibit 7 in the view
of the jury.
I t should be noted that the very exhibition of the
pinch bar to the jury, let alone the receipt of it into
evidence by the court, was error and prejudicial error,
for two fundamental reasons:
1. The pinch bar (Exhibit 7) was irrelevant and
incompetent because:
a. The charge was non-aggravated robbery.
b. The original Complaint charging aggravated
robbery, which the court at preliminary hearing
ordered dismissed and amended to charge nonaggravated robbery, did not allege that a pinch
bar or a steel instrument of any kind was used,
but merely alleged the use of a wooden club.
c. There was absolutely no evidence [except
whatever was shown by Travis' prior testimony
in his own case (TR. 207-209, 228, 230, 232-233,
241 and 246)] before the jury which tended to
show that a club of any kind, let alone the steel
pinch bar (Exhibit 7), was used in the alleged
robbery and there was absolutely no evidence which
could, in any way, connect the pinch bar to the
alleged robbery.
2. Exhibit 7, the steel pinch bar approximately 12
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to 16 inches in length with an electrical corp wrapped
around one end to form a handle, had a shocking and
gruesome appearance, particularly when the concept of
its use as a weapon was suggested by the prosecution,
and its introduction and receipt into evidence could
only serve to inflame the jury against the appellant.
I t seems incongruous that the prosecution would
introduce, and vouch for, testimony given by Travis
at his earlier, severed trial which testimony tended to
exculpate Travis and inculpate the appellant and at
the same time seek, obtain and attempt to sustain the
conviction of Travis in spite of the fact Travis' testimony exculpates Travis.
I t is also unfortunate that the trial court would,
on one hand, grant a motion to sever the trials of Travis
and appellant, which motion was grounded upon extreme prejudice to the defendants resulting from their
asserting radically different versions as to what happened in connection with the alleged offense, and then,
on the other hand, permit the introduction of Travis'
version, radically different from that of appellant, in
such a way that appellant could have no opportunity to
cross-examine Travis on Travis' version. In so doing,
the court compounded the prejudice which required
severance in the first place.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Appellant was deprived of his constitutionally
guaranteed right to confront the witnesses against him
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and to cross-examine those witnesses where the court
permitted the prosecutor to ask leading and suggestive
questions of appellant's co-defendant and where the
court permitted the verbatim record of said co-defendant's testimony in his own behalf given at his own trial
to be used in appellant's trial under the circumstances
where appellant could not cross-examine his co-defendant. Under the circumstances of this case, appellant has been prejudiced in the extreme by the actions
of the prosecutor in adducing Travis' testimony and
the pinch bar and by the court in receiving said evidence. Appellant's conviction should be set aside and
appellant discharged or, that failing, the case should be
remanded for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this 20. day of March,
1975.
H O U S L E Y & BLACK
316 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

(^Atforneys for Defendam-Appellant
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Filed 10 copies of the within Brief
with the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
and served 2 copies on the plaintiff-respondent
by delivering copies thereof to his attorney
The Attorney General for the State of Utah
thisr^) day of March, 1975.
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